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Abstract: 
In civil cases that took place in southern courts from the end of the Civil War to the 
mid-twentieth century, black men and women frequently chose to bring litigation and then 
negotiated the white-dominated legal system to shape their cases and assert rights. In some 
ways, these civil cases were diametrically opposite from the criminal cases of black 
defendants who did not choose to enter a courtroom and often received unequal justice. 
However, this article draws on almost 2,000 cases with black litigants in eight state supreme 
courts across the South between 1865 to 1950 to argue that in both civil and criminal cases 
African Americans were at times shaping their cases and fighting for their rights, as well as 
obtaining decisions that aligned with the interests of white elites. Southern state courts during 
the era of Jim Crow were thus spaces for negotiating for rights and sites of white domination, 
in both criminal and civil cases.   
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Reframing Black Southerners’ Experiences in the Courts, 1865-1950 
In 1906, two county courts in Georgia met to hear a case involving an African 
American litigant.  In the first case, a white farmer’s wife named Georgia Hembree accused a 
black man named Will Johnson of raping her between 6:00 a.m. and 7:00 a.m. on the 
morning of August 15, 1906. Johnson did not match the physical description Hembree had 
given to a reporter immediately after the crime – she had told the reporter the rapist was 
“heavyset” while Johnson was described as “slender.” But now, three months later, Hembree 
had identified Johnson as the rapist and Johnson was unable to produce a strong alibi. He said 
only that he was sick that day and had stayed home from work. His lawyers, assigned the 
case only a few days earlier, did little to refute the charge. After a brief trial, the jury 
convicted Johnson of the crime and sentenced him to hang. Then, the case took on a new 
twist. The white foreman at Johnson’s employer, a concrete company, discovered a time-
book that showed Johnson had worked from 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. on August 15. He and a 
white sub-foreman submitted affidavits testifying that Johnson had been at work the morning 
of the alleged rape.  The sub-foreman noted, too, that the Atlanta-based concrete company 
was at least a forty-minute walk from the site of the crime. Yet within the one-hour window 
that Hembree had placed the crime, she had said the rape occurred “nearer seven” o’clock. 
On the basis of the new evidence, Johnson’s lawyers applied for a new trial. When the local 
court denied their request, they appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia. The state’s highest 
court, though, affirmed the lower court’s conviction of Johnson. Because Hembree may have 
been referring to “sun time” and the foreman to “railroad time” they explained that Johnson’s 
alibi was still not “perfect.” In the end, Johnson was executed for a crime it would have been 
almost impossible for him to have committed.1 
That same year, another case involving a black litigant came before a Georgia county 
court. Unlike Johnson’s criminal case, this was a civil suit. Lou Bonds, an elderly black 
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woman, alleged that she had approached a white woman named Mrs. C.G. Brown for a loan 
of $406. Brown agreed to a one-year loan on the condition that Lou Bonds give her a 
“warranty deed” to her land – essentially using the elderly woman’s land as security for the 
loan. Just before the loan came due, in the fall of 1904, Brown approached Lou Bonds and 
allegedly told her she could have an extra year to pay off her debt if she signed a document 
extending the loan. Bonds agreed and signed the document. Soon, though, she discovered that 
the new document had actually transferred all of her land – worth an estimated fifteen 
hundred dollars – to Brown.  The two women then turned to the courts to contest the 
transaction.  First the case was brought to a magistrate’s court, which ruled against Lou 
Bonds. With the aid of two white lawyers, Bonds then brought a suit in 1906 before the local 
superior court. In an affidavit presented at the trial, Bonds framed the dispute to enhance her 
own legal claims and appeal to the white judge’s understanding of race. To show her lack of 
understanding of the transaction, she described herself as “an ignorant negro woman, without 
education” who “had the utmost confidence in Mrs. Brown and signed the paper without any 
knowledge as to its contents.” In fact, the court record noted, Bonds had some writing ability 
and may not have been as uneducated as she claimed. Bonds’ case also leveraged the 
testimony of whites to strengthen her claims. During the trial, several local white men gave 
affidavits in support of Bonds, stating that her land was worth far more than $406.  In the 
end, both the trial court and on appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court, ruled in favor of Lou 
Bonds and declared the transaction to have been usurious and void.2  In this case, the black 
litigant obtained exactly what she sought from the southern justice system. 
 
For many years, scholars have been all too aware of the obstacles that African 
Americans like Will Johnson faced in criminal cases in the post-Civil War South, 
documenting a host of factors – former slaveholders’ desire to maintain power, state and local 
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officials’ quest for profits, and white southerners’ fear and racism – that yielded a criminal 
justice system that handed down vastly different justice for people of color and incarcerated 
millions of black southerners.3 At the same time, the civil cases that African Americans like 
Lou Bonds litigated in the same courts have largely escaped scholars’ attention.4 Yet in civil 
cases that took place in southern courts from the end of the Civil War to the mid-twentieth 
century, a number of individual black men and women chose to bring litigation before a 
southern court, hired white lawyers, and then negotiated the white-dominated legal system to 
shape their own cases and assert rights. More often than not, in the cases examined, black 
litigants won their appellate civil suits against whites.5 In some ways these civil cases were 
diametrically opposite from the criminal cases of black defendants who did not choose to 
enter a courtroom, often had very limited legal representation, and received starkly unequal 
sentences. In other ways, African Americans’ civil and criminal cases in southern courts were 
more similar than they initially seemed.  
This article argues that examining civil and criminal cases together allows a fuller and 
more nuanced understanding of African Americans’ experiences in the justice system in the 
postbellum South. If one only looks at criminal cases in southern courts, it can appear that the 
justice system was something African Americans could rarely negotiate and assert rights in. 
Only looking at civil cases, however, can minimize the brutality of the justice system and its 
role in upholding white supremacy. But looking at both criminal and civil cases together 
brings forward a more complicated picture. This was a justice system in which black litigants 
initiated civil cases as well as had criminal cases brought against them. It was a system where 
African Americans could negotiate the system in some cases for their own benefit and could 
assert their rights. At the same time, it was a system that worked to maintain white supremacy 
and ruined millions of lives. 
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Examining these civil and criminal cases in tandem also provides insights into 
particular kinds of cases. On one side, black southerners’ civil suits help us better understand 
their criminal cases. In civil cases, the way that black litigants negotiated a white-dominated 
system to gain a favorable outcome is often clearly manifest. In criminal cases, black 
litigants’ attempts to influence the cases’ outcome are often subtler. But when one looks for 
it, black defendants were also at times working to shape their cases and assert their rights, 
even as they often had considerably greater barriers in doing so.  Criminal cases shed light on 
civil cases during the same period, too. Looking at the depth of racism black litigants faced in 
criminal cases helps us to understand the proceedings and outcomes in African Americans’ 
seemingly successful civil suits. In fact, the outcome of black southerners’ civil suits – even 
when they won – often relied just as much on ideas of white supremacy as criminal cases.  
Through an examination of the range of black southerners’ litigation, then, this article 
contends that southern state and local courts during the era of Jim Crow were often both 
spaces for shaping cases and fighting for rights and sites of white domination, in criminal and 
civil cases alike. Black litigants could sometimes influence their suits and assert their rights 
in criminal cases in which they were on trial for their lives as well as in civil cases over 
property and test cases over equal rights. Concurrently, black litigants experienced the power 
of white supremacy as they gained decisions in their favor in civil suits as well as upon 
receiving vastly unjust sentences in criminal cases. A decision in an individual black person’s 
favor could reinforce whites’ property rights, strengthen racial hierarchies, and protect whites 
from hazards in their communities just as a decision against a black litigant could reinforce 
white economic, social, and political power. This duality within the courtroom took place in 
everyday cases involving individual black men and women, as well as in high profile suits 
initiated or supported by racial justice organizations.   
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Increasingly, other scholars have also shown the courts to be both sites of oppression 
and crucial spaces in the struggle over rights. However, not all courts have been viewed 
equally as spaces where this duality could occur. Certain courts, at particular times in history, 
are more frequently portrayed as providing spaces for contesting inequality. In particular, 
scholars have given particular consideration to the struggle for African American rights in 
local and federal courts in the antebellum era, the period of Reconstruction, and the long 
Civil Rights era.6 This article demonstrates that both of these processes occurred even in 
courts seen as particularly oppressive such as southern state courts under Jim Crow.  I argue, 
too, that instead of stopping and starting, black southerners’ contestations of rights and 
negotiations of a white-dominated legal system, as well as the impact of white supremacy 
within the courtroom, occurred throughout the period from 1865 to 1950, continuing through 
the height of Jim Crow. 
SOURCES USED 
To analyze African Americans’ experiences in different kinds of cases in southern 
courts, this article draws on my examination of almost two thousand cases in eight state 
supreme courts across the South from 1865 to 1950. To find these cases, I began by 
conducting keyword searches in southern state supreme court records on the legal database 
LexisNexis to identify civil and criminal cases involving African American litigants between 
1865 and 1950. As my keyword terms related to race or captivity, the thousands of case 
reports generated identified African Americans by racial categorization or as former slaves. I 
then went to archives in the eight southern states to examine archival case files containing the 
trial and appellate records for the suits. In all, I located 1,377 civil cases involving African 
American litigants between 1865 and 1950 in the state supreme courts of eight states: 
Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, Tennessee, and 
Virginia. About two-thirds of these civil cases took place between black and white litigants; 
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about a third took place between black litigants.7 I also searched for criminal appeals cases 
involving African American appellants in the highest courts of Georgia and Alabama across 
the period of 1865 to 1950 and found 561 criminal cases. In Georgia and Alabama, these civil 
and criminal cases with black litigants made up 1.1 percent of the overall case load of the two 
state supreme courts.8   
My research used both quantitative and qualitative study of these civil and criminal 
cases to better understand African Americans’ range of experiences in the southern legal 
system. I paid particular attention to the archival case files, the vast majority of which have 
survived and are available in state archives. Frequently, the case files of suits that reached 
southern appellate courts are one to two hundred pages long and include the full lower court 
proceedings, including the trial testimony, lower court petitions, and the lower court decision, 
as well as the appeals to the higher court and the higher court opinion. Despite the value of 
these case files as historical sources, the archival records of many civil suits – and some 
criminal suits – have gone largely unnoticed by scholars for generations.9 As I read through 
the case files, I entered quantitative factors in a spreadsheet while also analyzing details of 
the trials, including taking note of the trial testimony, the language of the appeals, litigants’ 
and lawyers’ strategies, barriers the cases encountered, and reasons given for the outcome in 
the decisions. My research was shaped as well by my original research focus on black 
litigants’ civil cases. After I then took an in-depth look at the criminal case files, I began to 
notice links and similarities between these two kinds of cases that initially seemed so 
different.  
This research has significant limits. These cases eventually reached states’ highest 
courts and are not representative of all of the cases that came before southern trial courts. 
Untold numbers of other civil disputes and criminal proceedings never reached trial or were 
never appealed. However, analyzing suits in this way allows a systematic examination of 
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cases involving black litigants and provides a broader and longer view of their litigation than 
would otherwise be possible. In addition, the extensive and well-preserved trial records 
within these case files allow in-depth analysis in a way that county records often do not. 
Moreover, these suits are often more representative of black southerners’ litigation than they 
might seem. Although cases that made it to appellate courts often had particularly strong 
claims and at times litigants had greater resources than their peers, the litigants in these civil 
and criminal cases were drawn from a wide swath of the black population in the South. 
Particularly in the decades after the Civil War, many litigants had little education and a 
sizable number were former slaves.10 Throughout much of this time, as well, state supreme 
courts accepted many of the cases appealed to them, although this varied by state and 
changed over time. (Kagan et al. 1977, 128-32; Milewski 2018, 6-7, note 18 on p.237). 
Finally, because these suits seem to be a significant portion of the appellate cases litigated by 
black southerners in the states in question, they give important insights into how black 
litigants interacted with the highest courts of law in southern states and how such courts made 
decisions in suits involving African Americans. 
DIVERGENCES IN BLACK SOUTHERNERS’ CRIMINAL AND CIVIL CASES  
To some African Americans in the post-war South, the judicial system was not 
undifferentiated. Instead, these observers recognized differences across individual cases and 
courtrooms, including variations between black southerners’ experiences in civil and criminal 
cases. In particular, while commentators frequently observed that they were at a disadvantage 
in both types of cases, some noted that the disadvantage seemed greater in criminal cases, 
particularly when such cases involved crimes against whites. Wilford H. Smith, an 
extraordinary black lawyer who argued multiple cases over racial discrimination before the 
US Supreme Court, wrote at the turn of the century: “With the population of the South 
distinctly divided into two classes, not the rich and poor, not the educated and ignorant, not 
9 
 
the moral and immoral, but simply whites and blacks, all negroes being generally regarded as 
inferior and not entitled to the same rights as any white person, it is bound to be a difficult 
matter to obtain fair and just results, when there is any sort of conflict between the races. The 
negro realizes this, and knows that he is at an immense disadvantage when he is forced to 
litigate with a white man in civil matters, and much more so when he is charged with a crime 
by a white person” (Smith 1903, 144). Black-operated newspapers also occasionally noted 
distinctions between civil and criminal litigation. An article in The Savannah Tribune, for 
instance, implied that whites’ decisions to initiate criminal rather than civil cases against 
African Americans in contract disputes played a part in migration out of a state.11 
Black southerners’ actions provide additional evidence of a perceived difference 
between civil and criminal cases. In several instances in the cases examined, black men and 
women turned to civil litigation in a dispute, while the whites in the dispute turned to 
criminal cases to gain their ends. For example, when an African American tenant farmer in 
North Carolina named Jesse Jackson disagreed with the white landowner about the crops he 
was owed, the black tenant initiated a civil suit. In response, the white landowner initiated 
criminal action against Jackson for “larceny of cotton seed,” leading Jackson to be 
imprisoned in an insane asylum two times over the space of two and a half years. Despite 
these experiences with criminal justice, Jackson maintained some faith in civil action, 
initiating a civil case in 1939 against his former landlord to recover damages for “false 
imprisonment.”12 In other instances, suits that involved potentially criminal actions against 
African Americans were brought by black litigants against whites in civil courts.13   
Indeed, as these black southerners observed, there were significant differences in 
black litigants’ experiences in civil and criminal cases in southern courts from the end of the 
Civil War to the mid-twentieth century.  Many of these differences made it significantly 
easier for civil litigants to shape and win their cases than black defendants. First, in civil 
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cases that took place in southern courts during this period, individual black men and women 
frequently chose to initiate the litigation. In civil cases between black and white southerners 
that reached eight southern states’ highest courts between 1865 and 1950, African Americans 
had served as plaintiffs in the lower court trial in 790 out of 980 such cases (eighty-one 
percent of suits). While these statistics are not representative of all local trials and depend in 
part on whether plaintiffs and defendants appealed cases, they show that black litigants 
initiated a significant number of civil suits. The fact that black litigants were initiating civil 
cases gave them a measure of control over the process and allowed more deliberate planning.  
In contrast, in criminal cases in the U.S. South during this period, black defendants 
almost never chose to enter the justice system. In disputes, too, black southerners turned to 
the criminal courts much less often.14 Very occasionally, though, they appealed to criminal 
law just as they turned to civil law. In 1899, Rachael Nobles, a sixty-five-year-old black 
landowner, discovered five white men illegally cutting timber on her North Carolina land. 
Boldly, she approached them and “forbid them from cutting on her woodland & carrying off 
her timber & ordered them to desist & go away.”  In response, she was met with jeers and a 
shout that “she had no land.” She replied that she would have warrants for the men’s arrest 
“before sun went down.” Indeed, later that day an officer arrested the men and they were 
soon after convicted of “forcible trespass.”15 Such cases remained the exception; far more 
often, African Americans had criminal cases forced upon them. 
There were significant differences as well regarding who took part in civil and 
criminal cases that reached appeals courts, and how often these cases occurred.  Civil litigants 
at times had more resources than black defendants and seem to have been more likely to be 
land owners. In addition, black women appeared in far more southern appellate civil suits 
than appellate criminal cases. Black women served as one of the litigants in forty-one percent 
of civil suits between black and white southerners in the eight appellate courts examined. At a 
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time when white men dominated the legal system, many of these black women consciously 
chose to bring their civil disputes into the southern court system and demonstrated 
considerable legal acumen during trials. In contrast, African American women made up only 
five percent of black litigants in criminal appeals cases in Georgia and Alabama.16 
Additionally, throughout almost a century after the Civil War, black litigants in Georgia and 
Alabama were twice as likely to enter the appellate judicial system as parties in criminal suits 
than as litigants in civil suits against another southerner. By comparison, throughout the US, 
civil cases made up the vast majority of state supreme court case volumes.17  
Black litigants’ quality of representation could also vary considerably, depending in 
part on their resources and whether it was a civil or criminal case. In both kinds of cases, 
African Americans had to work within a justice system dominated by white attorneys. Only a 
very small number of lawyers in postbellum southern states were African American. In 1900, 
in the eight states examined, fewer than two percent of the lawyers were African American 
(Smith 1993, 624-25). But in civil cases, it was often easier to gain white lawyers’ support. 
For one, civil cases generally appeared less threatening to whites than criminal cases. At 
times, African Americans’ civil cases seemed to support whites’ own interests or white 
supremacy itself. Cases over bequests left to African Americans by former masters, for 
instance, were just as much over white men’s right to leave their property to who they 
wished, as they were about the former slaves’ right to receive it.  In addition, some of black 
litigants’ civil cases could prove very lucrative to white lawyers that took them on. 
Increasingly, from the mid-nineteenth century on, American lawyers operated on contingency 
fees, ranging from five to fifty percent of the overall reward if their client won the case 
(Karsten 1998), 231-260; Leubsdorf 1984, 9-36). A number of the civil cases litigated by 
African Americans in state supreme courts could yield a large reward from a corporation or 
estate, and thus a significant fee for the lawyers. Lou Bonds’ case was over a piece of land 
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valued at fifteen hundred dollars and her lawyer’s fees were likely at least ten percent of 
that.18  Motivated in large part by such financial rewards, in the years following the Civil War 
white lawyers throughout the South often represented black litigants in civil cases. These 
lawyers often included leading whites in the community, who had held or would go on to 
hold positions of power in southern legislatures and courts. Frequently, they represented 
black litigants well in cases that reached appeals courts, putting significant effort and time 
into their cases.19  
In criminal cases, in contrast, white lawyers stood to lose far more and gain far less.  
Representing an African American litigant in a controversial murder or rape case could have 
detrimental effects on a white lawyer’s career or even lead to violence.  Probably because 
white lawyers did not always want these cases, when African American lawyers represented 
black clients in the South it often was in criminal trials in lower courts (McMillen 1989, 215-
17; Lofgren 1987, 30-31; Smith 1993, 271-368).  In general, though, black litigants had to 
deal with white lawyers in criminal cases as well.  At times, they hired such lawyers 
themselves. In the majority of cases that went on to appeals courts, though, they seem to have 
been represented by court-appointed counsel in their trial, with varying abilities and 
willingness to represent their clients well. Often, they did not have the funds for any other 
lawyers; occasionally, they were not given the chance to hire a lawyer of their own. In part 
because of white lawyers’ lack of time or stomach for such cases, in many instances, criminal 
charges were plea-bargained before reaching trial.20  Black defendants’ limited legal 
representation, therefore, had serious – and sometimes fatal – implications for their cases. 
Similarly, the timing of these two types of cases made it easier for black civil litigants 
to successfully appeal to white judges’ and jury members’ sympathies and support their legal 
claims. In civil cases, black litigants often had months to work with their lawyers to develop 
legal strategies to prepare for the trial. The lawyers’ preparations in Lou Bonds’ suit were 
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already in motion in December 1905, four months before the case was heard by the county 
court in March 1906.21 In contrast, in criminal cases, black defendants had far less time to 
work with their lawyers to develop their case. Even when they received conscientious court-
appointed lawyers, black defendants often had only a few minutes with their attorneys shortly 
before the trial.22 At other times, African Americans were not even aware of the charge 
against them until they entered the courtroom.23  Will Johnson’s white lawyers had more time 
than many black litigants’ lawyers to meet the defendant and develop the case. They 
submitted an affidavit on the appeal that they had been “appointed by the court on a Monday 
to defend the defendant, and after consulting with defendant on that day” worked on the case 
until Thursday and then brought the case to trial on a Friday. Even if they did work as much 
as they claimed, though, these several days on the case were not enough to yield the alibi for 
Johnson that came out in the appeal.24  
Moreover, in both kinds of suits African Americans had to work within whites’ 
preconceptions.  Yet in civil suits African Americans at times could make whites’ 
stereotyping – including tropes like the “loyal slave” – work in their favor. In contrast, 
criminalized images of African Americans that influenced criminal cases almost never helped 
black defendants’ suits.  Ideas of African Americans as dangerous and naturally inclined to 
crime were a longstanding notion that stretched back to the pre-emancipation South 
(Oshinsky 1996, 32; Haley 2016, 36-38; Ayers 1992, 153-158; Kendi 2016, 1-358). The 
criminalization of African Americans was given even greater impetus at the end of the 
nineteenth century when white southern Democrats declared there to be an epidemic of black 
men raping white women to push disfranchisement through (Dailey 2009, xxii-xxiv; Hodes 
1997, 176-208). As a result of these ideas, actions that may have seemed unthreatening if 
done by whites took on a menacing tone to white southerners when they involved African 
Americans. In one case, a white fifteen-year-old girl reported that when she saw a black 
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teenager coming toward her while she was outside alone, “I got up and started running.”25 
Moreover, skin color alone could be the primary identifying factor when looking for 
perpetrators of crimes (A South Carolinian 1877, 474; Oshinsky 1996, 33-34; Ayers 1984, 
176-77). Georgia Hembree seems to have identified Will Johnson as the rapist largely based 
on the color of his skin as the other identifying characteristics she mentioned to a reporter on 
the day of the alleged rape – short height, a “thickset” figure, and a mustache – did not apply 
to him.26 With such preconceptions coloring the minds of many whites involved in criminal 
cases, there was often only so much black defendants could do to shape their suits. 
BLACK LITIGANTS’ ABILITY TO SHAPE CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES 
Yet despite the structural differences between these two types of suits, black civil litigants 
and black defendants in criminal cases both at times shaped their cases and negotiated the 
southern legal system to obtain specific outcomes. Undoubtedly, black civil litigants often 
had more opportunities to influence their cases than African American defendants. As 
discussed above, black civil litigants had often chosen their own lawyers and remained in 
conversation with their lawyers throughout the litigation. Knowledge could move both ways 
in such discussions, as lawyers’ legal claims were influenced by litigants and litigants learned 
about aspects of the law from their attorneys. In civil cases, black litigants also often had the 
opportunity to testify. As they testified, many black civil litigants shaped their words based 
on their understandings of southern race relations to appeal to white jury members’ and 
judges’ sympathies and interests. At times, black litigants’ testimony also drew on their 
knowledge of the legal claims of the case and sought to back up the legal claims made by 
their lawyers (Milewski 2018, 66-68). In contrast, a prohibition existed in Georgia against 
defendant testimony throughout this period and even in Alabama, defendants generally were 
not questioned in the trials examined from the end of the Civil War to the mid-twentieth 
century. However, in many cases in these states the defendant was given the opportunity to 
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give an unsworn statement to the jury during the trial.27 During criminal appeals, black 
litigants also at times submitted affidavits and worked with lawyers to shape their defense.  
The greater ability that black civil litigants had to shape their suits can be seen in the 
ways they framed their cases to appeal to whites in varying ways. In many civil cases, black 
litigants’ testimony drew on both legal knowledge and their understanding of race relations in 
their communities to reinforce their cases. Their exact strategies varied during different 
periods of southern history.  During the three-and-a-half decades after the Civil War, a 
sizeable number of these cases revolved around wills in which former masters and other 
whites had left black litigants bequests; other suits involved disputes over contracts, 
transactions and property dealings.28 In such suits, black litigants sometimes took advantage 
of continuing ties with former masters and other local whites as they negotiated the legal 
system. At times, this involved procuring respected local whites to testify in their favor. In 
one 1871 case, a formerly enslaved man named John Anderson brought a suit against his 
former master’s executor to gain funds left to him in a will to pay for his education in the 
North. During the trial, four local white men testified in his favor and supported his claim to 
the funds. One white witness, who seemed to have been acquainted with the black litigant 
before the war, reinforced the former master’s intention to leave funds for Anderson, stating: 
“Saw decedent often just before his death + heard him say often he had made provisions for 
John in his will.”29 Occasionally former slaves emphasized their loyalty and obedience to 
their former masters and mistresses in their testimony, reinforcing similar arguments in their 
lawyers’ petitions. In an 1881 Kentucky case over a former slaveholder’s bequest, the elderly 
black litigant, Minta Simmons, testified that she remained with her former master “from the 
time she was freed to his death and performed her duties faithfully.”30 In a number of 
instances, black litigants also sought to support their lawyers’ legal arguments in their 
testimony. In one 1877 Alabama suit, a formerly enslaved litigant named Mary Gracie and 
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her lawyer sought to prove that a piece of property had been bought with her own money 
rather than by her former master. During the trial, Gracie listed off a series of payments she 
had made: “I paid Steve Bowles one Hundred + ninety dollars for putting the fence around 
the lot. I paid said Stevens + Bowles Twenty five dollars for a cross fence … I gave Mr 
Semple one hundred ninety or Two hundred Dollars to pay Mr Noland for building the 
house.”31 These details reinforced her lawyer’s claims that she had personally paid the money 
for the property and the home. Through statements and connections such as this, black 
litigants in the three and a half decades after the Civil War worked to put the force of the law 
behind their own claims, and – together with their legal counsel – crafted their images in 
ways whites might find most palatable.   
When disfranchisement and segregation were enacted in an organized manner around the 
South at the end of the nineteenth century, black civil litigants adapted and narrowed their 
suits to fit the new context. In the first two decades of the twentieth century, the majority of 
appellate civil cases between black and white southerners involved instances of fraud or 
personal injury.32 In such cases, black litigants continued to draw on both their knowledge of 
the law and of southern race relations.  In her 1906 fraud suit, Lou Bonds showed an 
understanding of a key to her lawyers’ legal arguments – that nothing had been given to her 
in exchange for the land that the white woman claimed. Bonds noted in her affidavit that 
“there was no additional consideration paid her in any manner nor was anything whatever 
mentioned about such a thing.” At other times, black litigants’ testimony supported both their 
legal claims and appealed to whites’ racial ideologies. In fraud cases, a legal claim of fraud 
was strengthened if one party had significantly greater understanding of the transaction than 
the other and if the deceived party had trusted the defrauder.  As a result, black litigants’ 
cases that reached southern appeals courts often presented the black men and women 
litigating the cases as ignorant and vulnerable and as having trusted the whites involved. 
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Their generally white lawyers played an important part in this presentation, but black litigants 
portrayed themselves in this way in their testimony as well.  Lou Bonds, if one remembers, 
had described herself in an affidavit as “an ignorant negro woman without education” who 
implicitly trusted the white Mrs. Brown.33 Other black litigants in fraud cases in the South 
during this time generally presented themselves in similar ways. In addition to strengthening 
their legal claims, by presenting themselves as unequal and dependent and asking for white 
aid, black civil litigants appealed to white judges’ and juries’ idealized memories of the Old 
South and beliefs of racial superiority (McElya 2007; Blight 2001; McLaughlin 2004, 285-
309).   
Then, between 1921 and 1950, as developments such as World War I and II and the 
Great Migration influenced southern society, the types of cases and the ways that African 
Americans presented themselves in civil cases litigated in southern courts broadened. While 
slightly over half of the civil cases examined between black and white southerners still 
involved fraud and personal injury, black litigants increasingly also litigated cases against 
whites over property, transactions, insurance, racial justice, and bequests.34 Moreover, when 
black litigants in civil cases during this period backed up their lawyers’ legal arguments, it 
was increasingly by asserting their rights under the law. Recall the 1939 case in which an 
African American tenant farmer in North Carolina named Jesse Jackson disagreed with his 
white landowner about the crop he was owed and the white landowner instigated Jackson’s 
imprisonment in an insane asylum. When Jackson initiated a civil case against his former 
landlord after the ordeal, he asserted his right to not be falsely imprisoned through his very 
act of litigation. In addition, his testimony asserted how his rights had been violated. He 
described in detail to the court how he had been confined in the state mental hospital on two 
occasions, and “remained in confinement this last time six months and twenty-one days.” His 
case noted as well that he was discharged from the hospital each time as sane and as a result 
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of the confinement had lost his position as a pastor. Other civil cases during this time, 
including cases over seemingly prosaic issues of injury and property, also increasingly 
asserted black litigants’ rights.35  
In contrast, the strategies used by black criminal litigants to defend themselves in 
court between 1865 and 1950 were generally less developed than the tactics in many African 
Americans’ civil cases. Due in part to criminal defendants’ more limited legal representation 
and the shorter time to prepare for trial, there is less change over time in how black litigants 
negotiated the legal system in criminal cases and less conscious shaping of their images for 
the courtroom. Indeed, with only limited time to prepare, Johnson’s efforts to defend himself 
in the trial are less sophisticated than the strategies in many civil cases. Johnson’s statement 
to the jury is brief and straightforward, stating only that he did not know “anything at all” 
about the crime and had been at home with an injured back on the day of the alleged rape.36  
Even in criminal cases, though, black litigants and their lawyers sometimes utilized 
some of the same courtroom strategies as black civil litigants. This occurred during their 
trials, as well as in appeals. To begin, like civil cases, some black criminal litigants’ suits 
sought to negotiate the racial ideologies of white jury members and white judges.  One key 
strategy to appeal to white decisionmakers was to procure whites to testify in the black 
litigant’s favor.  In many cases, the litigants’ lawyers appear to have obtained these witnesses 
on their own, but in some instances the litigants or their black allies seem to have played a 
part (Dorr 2004, 177-78; 191-96). In his appeal, Johnson, for instance, relied on the power of 
multiple white witnesses to back up his claims. In affidavits, both the white foreman and 
white sub-foreman at the concrete company corroborated that he had been at work on August 
15 and eight other white men provided affidavits about the good character of the foreman. 
While a crucial asset to a black criminal litigant’s case, this testimony could reinforce the 
white witnesses’ own power or support their own interests.37  
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As in civil cases, black criminal litigants also occasionally asserted their ties with 
local whites and even their loyalty to them. Upon being accused of killing his employer’s 
white wife, Arthur Burgess stated to the court that his employer “seemed to be a good friend 
of mine and so was his wife. Anything he wanted me to do I would do it.” Although it had no 
relevance to his alleged crime, another black litigant, Pris Marshall, similarly noted in his 
statement that he was “raised up with my masters children + went to war with them.”38 Such 
statements reinforcing criminal litigants’ links with local whites were carefully calibrated to 
appeal to the sympathies and racial attitudes of white jury members and judges. 
In other criminal cases, black litigants sought to shape their image before the court in 
ways that might be beneficial to their case’s outcome. Occasionally, African Americans 
accused of crimes defended themselves by emphasizing their ignorance or lack of knowledge 
about the legal process. Black defendant Wash Palmore stated, “At the time I was in the 
sheriff’s office in Dothan when you (Mr. Baxley) was present along with others, I didn’t 
know what ‘voluntary’ meant. I didn’t know what ‘freely’ meant. I did not know what ‘own 
accord’ meant.”39 Additionally, black criminal litigants at times tried to present themselves as 
“good” African Americans. One defendant stated multiple times in his defense statement that 
he “had always behaved myself.”40 
Other criminal litigants showed a sense of the necessary legal arguments they and 
their lawyers needed to make to be found innocent of a crime or to overturn a sentence. Like 
civil litigants, they may have been coached by their lawyers or may have had some 
knowledge of the law from previous experiences. In a lengthy statement to the jury in an 
1889 trial, defendant John Croom challenged his indictment for assault “with malice 
aforethought” by attempting to show that he had shot in the moment out of fear of his life. 
First, Croom emphasized his knowledge of the deceased’s previous violence against local 
African Americans.  According to Croom’s statement, when Mr. Hawkins came to arrest him 
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“I was afraid he would kill me because I had heard of his killing these people at Hills Dale 
trying to arrest them.” In describing the violence itself, Croom again emphasized the 
suddenness of the moment and his fear as the incident unfolded. When Hawkins “threw his 
gun up quick,” Croom testified, “…I shot because I was afraid that I was going to be Killed.” 
Through this framing of the event, Croom sought to strengthen his lawyer’s case that he had 
shot in self-defense and the crime had not been premeditated. Similarly, Johnson worked to 
strengthen his lawyers’ legal claims about why he had not offered a correct alibi in the trial.  
In his affidavit for the appeal, Johnson stated: “being innocent of the crime with which he is 
charged, he had no personal knowledge of the date upon which, or the time at which, the 
crime with which he is charged was actually committed…on account of the lapse of time, he 
had become confused and uncertain as to dates that long past.”41 As in civil cases involving 
fraud, this defense of ignorance worked to support the legal claims of Johnson’s criminal 
appeal.  
Most often, though, black criminal litigants focused on stating their innocence and 
their lack of knowledge about the crime. But in cases that would reach appellate courts, even 
such defenses frequently contained a level of detail that suggests the litigants were making a 
real effort to assert their innocence. In a typical statement, twenty-year-old Wilkin Curtis, 
who had been charged with robbery, noted that on the day of the alleged crime he had eaten 
his lunch at work “having brought my lunch with me from home that morning” and that after 
leaving his job “a few minutes after six o’clock” he “went into the house and helped my 
mother about the house for a few minutes and then had supper.” With such exhaustive 
accounts, black litigants were often trying to do all they could to establish their alibis, and 
thus their innocence.42 
 In sum, the ability of black litigants to shape their criminal cases was significantly 
more limited than their ability to do so in civil cases. However, black litigants at times tried 
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to shape the legal process in criminal as well as civil cases by appealing to white racial 
attitudes, working to reinforce their suit’s legal claims, or by providing a detailed 
explanation. Even in the most oppressive and limited of conditions, some black criminal and 
civil litigants negotiated the southern legal system to try to gain the best possible outcome. 
ASSERTING RIGHTS IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES 
Looking at criminal and civil cases side by side also reveals the way that both civil 
and criminal suits could be vehicles for black litigants to claim rights.  In changing ways over 
the period from 1865 to 1950, civil cases claimed economic rights, legal rights, and property 
rights, and asserted the right to not experience violence.  Throughout this period African 
Americans’ criminal cases also sometimes claimed rights, including the right to due process 
and to not experience violence and discrimination from police and in the judicial system. 
Black litigants’ civil and criminal cases also occasionally directly challenged racial 
discrimination itself. Civil and criminal cases explicitly orchestrated to test segregation and 
disfranchisement have received the lion’s share of attention in this regard.  In such cases, 
groups and organizations often carefully planned actions that would lead to civil or criminal 
cases that would test discrimination.43 However, civil and criminal cases that involved only 
individuals and grew out of local disputes and ordinary crimes could also challenge racial 
discrimination.   
 While some of black litigants’ civil cases did not specifically refer to rights, the act of 
bringing a civil case asserted their right to own property, inherit, and serve as litigants. 
Throughout the 85-year period examined, black litigants’ civil suits referred to particular 
rights as they made their claims. In the wake of the Civil War, some litigants and their 
lawyers appealed to new citizenship rights. The petition of one group of former slaves in 
1872 Mississippi claimed that recent acts of the state and federal governments and 
amendments to the US Constitution had freed them, made them citizens, and given them the 
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ability to inherit property.44 In some cases, black southerners’ suits appealed to economic 
rights, including their right to make contracts, conduct transactions, hold property, and 
transfer property on an equal basis with whites. When a landowner refused to allow him to 
sell his own share of a crop, tenant farmer W.H. Weems consulted a lawyer regarding his 
rights. In a later civil case against the landowner, Weems told the court that the lawyer had 
told him “you are out of debt and you have a perfect right to sell it” and therefore he had done 
so. Weems’ testimony also appealed to the contract to enforce to his rights, stating: “I was to 
have half of the crop, that was the contract.” At other times, black litigants mentioned their 
right to bring disputes to court. In a 1907 fraud case, Andrew Carpenter noted that when the 
white defendant refused to retract a deed, “I came on then to see if I could get any rights in 
court.”45   
In the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s, black litigants’ civil cases also increasingly asserted 
their right to not experience violence. While white lawyers played a key part in such 
assertions, black litigants’ decision to litigate and their testimony about violence served a 
central role in such claims. Some suits asserted black litigants’ right to not experience 
violence in the workplace and to maintain their property without violence. In one case, a 
black sharecropper in Kentucky named Ed Lee Allen brought a civil suit for damages against 
a white landowner. Allen claimed that during a dispute over the sharecropper’s tobacco crop, 
the white man had “grabbed the corn knife and struck at me.” 46 Other civil cases in southern 
courts protested violence and intimidation against African Americans during economic 
dealings. Rosa Wilson and her husband brought a suit against the Singer sewing machine 
company and one of its agents, for instance, when the agent swore and physically assaulted 
her while attempting to collect a payment on a sewing machine.47 Still other black litigants 
highlighted violence they had experienced as passengers on public transportation. Patrick 
Hairston, for one, brought a suit contending that he had been asleep in the colored waiting 
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room at a bus station when two white station employees poured gasoline on his feet and set 
them on fire.48  
In civil cases, individual black litigants also challenged inequality in their own 
communities, often without backing from any larger organizations.  Like other cases claiming 
rights, such cases became more common beginning in the 1920s, but occurred throughout the 
period from 1865 to 1950. Often the outcomes of these suits would have a personal or 
economic impact on the litigants involved, as well as other people of color in their 
communities. A number of these cases protested the discrepancies in funding for schools for 
black children in the Jim Crow South.  In 1909, a black father and taxpayer named Robert 
Goins sued the tax collector of Jasper County, Mississippi.  In his suit, Goins challenged the 
constitutionality of a tax that had been assessed on all citizens of the county but would only 
benefit the white high school. Such a tax, the suit claimed, violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and “[abridged] the privileges…of the negro citizens of 
Jasper county.”49 Other racial justice civil suits challenged segregation ordinances and 
discriminatory practices that impacted their livelihoods. After losing all his seniority rights, 
one black railroad employee filed a suit in 1943 on behalf of “Negro locomotive firemen” 
alleging that the railroad and a white-only union had conspired to limit the employment of 
black firemen and firemen’s “seniority rights.”  Several years later, in 1950, four black law 
school graduates brought suit, claiming that the Alabama Board of Bar Commissioners put 
additional barriers to their admission to the state bar.50 These cases mattered personally and 
financially to the men and women litigating them but also held the power to bring greater 
equality for black Americans.   
Occasionally, civil suits took on constitutional equality with the intention of reaching 
the U.S. Supreme Court and forcing change. In one such suit in 1942, William Boswell 
brought a case against the local Board of Registrars when they refused to register him to vote. 
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The petition boldly stated his rights, noting that the Board of Registers had “refused to 
register your petitioner” and asserting that “it has become the general, habitual and systematic 
practice of said Board of Registrars…to refuse to register Negro Residents of said Jefferson 
County…and to deprive them of their rights of sufferage soly on account of race, color and 
previous condition of servitude.” This refusal, the petition continued, “is contrary to the 
provisions of the Constitution of the State of Alabama and violates the rights of your 
petitioner under the Constitution of the State of Alabama and under the Constitution of the 
United States and the 14th and 15th amendments thereto.” Other civil suits involving 
constitutional equality protested segregation in parks and racial discrimination on public 
transportation.51 
Some of the same assertions of rights found in civil cases – including claiming legal 
rights and the right to not experience violence – occasionally appeared in criminal cases 
during the same period.  Frequently these claims came through criminal appeals, in which 
appellants and their lawyers often had more time and resources to make their cases, and 
revolved around receiving fair treatment in the southern justice system. In particular, a 
number of convicted African American men and women appealed discriminatory actions of 
the police and criminal courts that they believed had played an unjust role in their 
convictions. Like some civil cases, these cases at times appealed to specific rights set out in 
the U.S. Constitution.  
The right to not experience violence in the justice system was a recurring theme in 
criminal appeals. A few criminal litigants highlighted the violence they experienced during 
their arrests in their statement during the trial or in affidavits included with the appeal. Robert 
Walker explained that when a sheriff searched him and found he had a gun, “the sheriff asked 
me to release the gun, and just as I got the gun out, he shot me, and his son hit me across the 
head.”52 A number of litigants claimed that their confessions had been given under duress, 
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including after threats of violence, deprivation of food and water, and extended violence. At 
times, such confessions were extorted by private citizens who then turned over the confessor 
to the police; at other times, such involuntary confessions were extracted by the police or 
jailors themselves.  Black teenager Jeff Gaskin’s appeal to Georgia’s highest court asserted 
that after his arrest he was repeatedly and “brutally beaten kicked and bruised” by the police 
over a period of several days in an effort to obtain his confession. He was told that he “would 
be continually subjected to such brutal mistreatment and intimidation until he did…confess to 
said crime.” Finally, after a month and a half in jail, the appeal stated, the petitioner “was so 
fearful for his life, health and safety” that he gave a formal confession to the crime of rape. 
No context to his confession was given during the trial and the jury voted to convict him. 
Similarly, Emma Canady, a black Georgia woman accused of killing her husband, stated in 
an affidavit in her appeal that she was driven by a group of police officers to the “old tin-top 
house” where “they doubled a wire and put it around my neck and chocked me.”  While the 
wire was around her neck, the sheriff questioned her about her husband’s death and, she 
stated, “I don’t know what I told them folks. I just told them anything to get rid of them.” In 
describing her confession in this way, Canady went farther than her lawyer, who did not 
directly challenge the confession in the appeal.53 Such statements about police brutality 
boldly challenged the violence endemic in the southern justice system. Further, by tying the 
violence to the litigants’ confessions, these statements contested the validity of the southern 
legal system itself.  
Other black appellants and their lawyers protested the lack of proper criminal 
procedure and due process in their trials. One appeal contested the outcome of a trial because 
the litigant had not been read his rights during the initial questioning.54 Some black litigants 
and their lawyers also based their appeals on their inability to confer with a lawyer or their 
lack of adequate representation. In one such case in 1885, a black Georgia preacher named 
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Wesley Hicks was convicted of vagrancy and sentenced to twelve months of “hard labor.”  In 
response, he appealed, requesting a new trial.  In the appeal, his lawyer stated that Hicks’s 
counsel had only been appointed to represent him “at the moment” of the trial and so did not 
have time to contact his employers who could have testified that he had worked throughout 
the year. Likewise, another black litigant, Sam Jackson, brought an appeal claiming that he 
did not know he had been charged with rape until he entered the courtroom. According to his 
deposition for the appeal, Jackson was then asked if he had an attorney and when he replied 
no, the judge appointed two young lawyers to defend him. Then, he explained, “his counsel 
and he went into the grand jury room, that adjoins the court room, to confer about his case.” 
However, he stated, “their conference lasted only two or three minutes, when bailiff called at 
the door and stated that the Judge said come on into the court room.”  Having such a short 
amount of time with his lawyers, Jackson said, did not allow “sufficient time to explain to his 
counsel his case, nor to tell his counsel what witnesses he would need in his trial…neither he 
nor this counsel had had time to prepare for trial.”55 By making these claims, black litigants 
challenged the way in which basic standards of criminal procedure were ignored during their 
arrests and trials. Despite their position enmeshed in the criminal justice system, the 
statements of these litigants claimed that legal rights should apply to them. 
Criminal cases of individual litigants in southern courts at times also asserted the right 
to not experience racial discrimination in the criminal justice system (Dorr 2004, 181-82).  
Between 1865 and 1950, several cases that reached the state supreme courts of Georgia and 
Alabama protested racist comments made by prosecutors during the trial. One 1909 Alabama 
case objected to the prosecutor’s remark to the jury disparaging the black witnesses: “You 
know the negro race—how they stick up to each other when accused of crime, and that they 
will always get up an alibi, prove it by perjured testimony of their own color, and get their 
accused companion clear if they can.”56 Additionally, several criminal appeals brought by 
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black litigants before these state supreme courts based their requests for new trials on their 
experiences of racial basis during their trial.  In some cases, black appellants and their 
lawyers claimed that African Americans had been excluded from the juries that had indicted 
and convicted them. In one 1882 Georgia case, the appellant Harrison Wilson contested his 
conviction for killing a white man on the grounds of the racial composition of the jury. 
According to his legal challenge, “persons of color or African race” were systematically 
excluded from jury service in the county that the trial had taken place “because of their race 
& color,” violating the 14th and 15th amendments of the U.S. Constitution.57 While these 
cases generally focused their claims on contesting the circumstances of their clients’ specific 
trial, by publicly highlighting the lack of black jury members in their counties or racist 
comments by prosecutors, black appellants’ cases had potentially larger implications. In some 
cases, it forced local whites to defend their practices to courts. Thus, even when they were 
not orchestrated by organizations to test discriminatory laws, civil and criminal cases could 
assert rights for individual litigants as well as other African Americans.  
OUTCOMES OF BLACK LITIGANTS’ CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES  
Even as black civil and criminal litigants worked to negotiate the southern legal 
system, decisions in both kinds of cases generally reinforced white economic, racial, and 
ideological interests, including the cause of white supremacy. On the surface, the outcomes in 
such suits seem significantly different.  In the eight state supreme courts examined, black 
litigants won fifty-nine percent of their civil cases on appeal between 1865 and 1950.  In 
contrast, in the criminal cases involving black appellants heard by the state supreme courts of 
Georgia and Alabama during that period, black litigants received favorable decisions from 
the appellate court in only thirty-eight percent of suits.58 For certain kinds of crimes, the 
chance of obtaining a decision in their favor was even lower. The Alabama and Georgia 
Supreme Courts overturned only twenty-four percent of appeals cases in which the black 
28 
 
litigant had been convicted of raping a white woman, the type of suit which Will Johnson 
appealed.   
In part, these statistics reflect the fact that higher courts were more likely to uphold 
lower courts’ decisions than to overturn them, and black litigants had won far more of the 
initial trials of civil cases being appealed in the lower courts than the initial trials of criminal 
cases appealed.59 Indeed, the overall rate of reversal by appellate courts in civil cases that 
took place between black and white litigants in the states examined (thirty-five percent) and 
in criminal cases with black defendants in the states examined (thirty-seven percent) is 
similar to the rate of reversal in appellate courts in the U.S. during this general period (38.5 
percent).60 The many differences in black litigants’ civil and criminal cases discussed in this 
article played a part in the varying lower court and appellate court outcomes as well.  Both 
kinds of trials also brought out different aspects of whites’ ideas about race.  Black 
defendants in criminal cases appeared dangerous to many white southerners while black civil 
litigants, like Lou Bonds, often seemed relatively harmless.   
Importantly as well, convicting African Americans in criminal cases was seen by 
many whites as in their interest, while deciding against them in civil cases was at times in 
whites’ interest, but at other times not in their interest. The southern system of criminal 
justice served multiple purposes that benefited whites. White southerners had long thought of 
African Americans as inclined toward crime, and they viewed criminal law as a key tool they 
had to control such tendencies. The criminal justice system also played an outsize role in 
regulating the southern labor market. Laws that criminalized leaving before completing a 
labor contract, for instance, allowed whites to control black southerners’ labor. Furthermore, 
black convicts made enormous sums of money for southern states and local law enforcement, 
who hired their labor for profit.  In addition, cases over black men allegedly raping white 
women helped to solidify white elites’ political control by increasing whites’ fear and 
29 
 
working to divide working class white and black southerners (Blackmon 2008, 51-154; 
Oshinsky 1996, 32, 40-84; Haley 2016, 58-118, 156-194; LeFlouria 2015; Hodes 1997, 176-
208).   
In contrast, many of the civil cases that black litigants were successful in appealing to 
state supreme courts involved areas of the law like property rights and inheritance that whites 
also brought cases over or dealt with dangers that affected whites as well. A decision 
upholding a black person’s property rights would strengthen white southerners’ property 
rights. A case initiated by an injured black litigant highlighting dangerous practices by a 
railroad could protect white citizens. Additionally, the vast majority of the civil cases 
between black and white southerners between 1865 and 1950 were initiated by individuals 
and involved economic claims that would primarily impact only their own families. Such 
civil suits brought by individual African Americans seemed relatively unthreatening and 
unlikely to have a real impact beyond the individuals involved. Lou Bonds’ case to regain her 
property involved only her own land, for instance, and seemed to have no impact beyond her 
suit. Thus, in civil cases that did not seem to have the potential to shake up society, judges 
often decided cases involving African Americans just as they decided other suits that came 
before them – relying on precedent and the merits of the case as well as their own opinions 
and considerations about the impact on the white community. For example, the higher court 
justices in Bonds’ case explained in their opinion that they had decided in favor of the elderly 
black woman because the purported conveyance of the land from Bonds to Mrs. Brown did 
not involve any payment to Brown or cancellation of debts but instead “purports to be 
nothing more than a gratuitous relinquishment” and does not show “any consideration 
moving from Mrs. Brown.”61  
However, in civil cases that directly confronted the interests of large numbers of 
whites, black southerners struggled to have their cases heard throughout much of this period 
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and generally ended up on the losing end. In particular, unlike most seemingly harmless civil 
cases, civil litigation that asserted rights for African Americans as a group unsettled many 
white Americans. Cases over racial equality, in particular, challenged white southerners in a 
way cases over property or contracts never could. As a result, black litigants won only thirty-
six percent of civil cases that focused on racial justice in southern appellate courts during this 
period – an almost identical rate to how often they won criminal appeals in such courts.62 
When black litigants did win civil cases over racial justice, one of the deciding factors may 
have been the assumption that their outcomes were unlikely to bring real change.       
Black southerners also often fared poorly in other civil cases that threatened the 
interests of large groups of whites. Mary Ray encountered this opposition when she brought a 
civil suit in 1889 against the local county commissioners, the most powerful white men in the 
North Carolina county where she lived. Her suit claimed the land upon which the local 
courthouse and jail were located. The dispute had begun decades earlier, before the Civil 
War. At the time, Mary Ray’s father Lewis Pratt had been a slave owned by a prominent 
white man in Durham, North Carolina. Pratt’s skills as a blacksmith had brought him favor 
with his master, and in the wake of the Civil War, his former owner gave him a deed to the 
two acres of land on which the blacksmith shop stood. At the time, the land was worth little 
and the deed was not challenged. Lewis Pratt took possession of the land, paying taxes on it 
each year.63   
Then, in 1873, the former slave died. Hearing of Pratt’s death, the executor carrying 
out his former owner’s will claimed that the deed to the two acres had been only for the 
duration of Pratt’s life and offered the land for sale. The land was bought by a local white 
man, and then three years later purchased by the town of Durham. Lewis Pratt’s family did 
not let the land go without a fight. In 1876, his widow and son brought a suit against the 
executor, alleging that William Pratt had given the land to Lewis Pratt outright. Rather than 
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giving their case a full hearing, the court appointed an arbitrator, who decided in favor of the 
white executor.64   
To most observers at this point, it no doubt seemed Lewis Pratt’s family had lost the 
land completely.  During the next decade, a new county courthouse and jail were built on the 
property and the Main Street of Durham cut through the land.  Then, in 1889, Lewis Pratt’s 
daughter Mary Ray hired a lawyer and filed suit against the Durham County Commissioners 
for the property. Because Ray’s brother and mother could not bring the land dispute to court 
again, Ray appeared as the sole litigant in the legal contest.65   
Realizing the intense bias in her own county against her suit, Mary Ray’s legal team 
requested the case to be removed to a neighboring county.  According to Ray’s testimony in 
support of the action, a change of venue was needed as she “cannot obtain justice in this 
Cause in said county” because of the interested nature of local leaders and judges.  She 
astutely summed up what she was up against: “That besides being gentlemen of marked 
personal influence and magnetism in said county, around which many interests are drawn and 
adhered, they as such Commissioners have under the law the control & supervision of the 
Jury system as well as all other official matters appertaining to the affairs of the County.”  
She concluded by expanding the charges of bias to include all the “jurors and tax payers” in 
the county, explaining that they had an interest in deciding against her to prevent additional 
taxes.66  
Mary Ray’s case likely came to court at all because it revolved around a white man’s 
deed and involved questions of property. But unlike many of the other civil cases litigated by 
black southerners over wills and property, her case threatened some of the most important 
institutions of the county as well as taxpayers’ bottom line.  As a result, even after Ray and 
her lawyer succeeded in gaining a change of venue to a neighboring county, they met 
obstacles at every turn.  In the new trial location, she had difficulty getting her witnesses to 
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appear.  The court hearing was delayed for several court terms.  Finally, in August 1891, the 
Orange County Superior Court heard her case and a jury ruled that she did not have an 
interest in the property. In response, Ray appealed the verdict to North Carolina’s highest 
court.  The higher court affirmed the county court’s ruling, arguing that there was a “total 
absence of words of inheritance” in the deed, which indicated that “the deed conveyed but an 
estate for life.” Mary Ray never recovered the property.67 Her interests were not only not 
aligned with those of local whites, they very much threatened their interests. Like most 
criminal cases, civil cases like Mary Ray’s supported white supremacy best when the black 
litigant lost.  
 
  To conclude, at first glance, the differences between African Americans’ experiences 
in civil and criminal cases seem glaring.  Upon closer examination, though, black litigants’ 
civil and criminal cases have a number of similarities. For one, there were real limits in both 
kinds of suits.  In both, black litigants were often dependent on white lawyers, white juries, 
and white judges and subject to whites’ stereotypes and judgment. Examining both kinds of 
cases together helps us see other similarities too. In civil cases, black litigants often worked 
to shape their testimony and suits to negotiate white judges’ and jury members’ ideas about 
race. Frequently, they asserted – either explicitly or implicitly – their economic and legal 
rights in their litigation. The recognition that this was occurring in civil cases allows an 
examination of the way individual black litigants were at times shaping their criminal suits 
and even using them to assert rights.  On the other hand, criminal cases highlight the deep 
injustice and power imbalance at the core of southern society. They clearly show the way the 
courts were used to uphold white interests. Even in the face of overwhelming evidence that 
Will Johnson had been at work at the time that the rape occurred, for instance, it was in the 
interests of turn-of-the-century whites to believe he was guilty. Examining these criminal 
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cases brings to the study of civil suits a greater understanding of the depth of white 
supremacy and violence in southern society. This helps to better understand decisions, such 
as the outcome of the Lou Bonds suit, that seem on the surface to be in black litigants’ favor. 
Such civil suits were also being decided in part based on the interests of white society. The 
key difference was that at times it was in the interest of whites deciding civil suits to side 
with the black litigant.  
This matters for several reasons. For one, looking at African Americans’ civil cases 
alongside their experiences in criminal cases changes how one views the southern justice 
system. Southern courts during the era of Jim Crow were not solely sites of white domination 
and oppression. Neither, however, were they spaces where African Americans could assert 
rights without experiencing the power of white supremacy.  Instead, the southern legal 
system was a site where power was both exercised and claimed, by ordinary people as well as 
by elites.  
Looking at these suits together also reveals both the brutality and occasional subtlety 
of the system of white supremacy that undergird daily life in the South as well as the 
astonishing boldness and creativity in which at times this white supremacy was challenged.  
A court could be working to further the ends of white power when ruling in favor of an 
elderly black woman by portraying her as unequal and in need of white assistance as well as 
when they condemned a man to death who many of the justices must have known was likely 
innocent. Moreover, even when black litigants had largely lost the right to vote and 
experienced widespread racial segregation, they still sought to negotiate within the last 
government institution still accessible to them, the courts. They did so by working with white 
lawyers to draw on the racial ideas of whites in their communities and by asserting their 
rights, even as they faced death sentences, the loss of land, and white violence.  
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In conclusion, these cases highlight the many limits within the southern judicial 
system, which could make them difficult spaces to claim rights and gain justice. At the same 
time, these suits demonstrate the ways that black southerners – even as they experienced 
segregation, disfranchisement, and violence – continued to seek to navigate the legal system 
in both civil and criminal cases to gain the best outcome for themselves and their families, 
and at times their larger communities. Despite the many structural differences in how civil 
and criminal cases proceeded, then, they were linked by black litigants’ assertions of their 
rights and negotiation of a biased system even in the face of deep and systematic racism.  
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